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SELECTED TERRORISTIC CLAIMS ARISING
FROM THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTEXT
JORDAN J. PAUST*

T

HIS PAPER ADDRESSES ITSELF to a subject of great importance and

complexity-terrorism in the Mid-East conflict. Recognizing the
vastness of this complex subject matter, this presentation focuses upon
and confines its scope to the content of relevant international law and the
efforts by some of the participants in the Mid-East struggle to justify
conduct or to seek approval of conduct through changes in the law. It
should be understood that the attempt herein is to consider law as it is and
law as it might develop-not to debate the propriety or impropriety of
the Israeli or Arab cause or of specific instances of terroristic usage.
Instead of imputing guilt or blame, we will consider the import of certain
claims to the community, the policies which the community seeks to
promote by international law and the effect of these on the basic quest
for human dignity. More specifically the focus here is on international
legal norms, general community policies which are at stake, generally
shared expectations of the community which provide content to legal
norms, and certain basic types of recurring claims by the participants in
the Mid-East struggle which will affect those policies and expectations or
which seek to change them. Hopefully such a focus will provide insight
and avoid the rhetorical confusion and sterile polemics which one often
finds in United Nations General Assembly debates on the matter.
Moreover, if some readers seek to justify the actual conduct of some
of their proxy heroes, then it should even be useful for them to consider
the types of claims being made by the participants and the content and
changing nature of law. A more rational and realistic discussion of the
permissibility or impermissibility of specific conduct in the Mid-East
context should, it is alleged, involve at a minimum a thorough exploration
of actual community consensus and the actual context of social interaction.
For a thorough exploration of consensus, there should at least be some
consideration of the developed legal norms which are relevant to the
particular terroristic usage, the generally shared expectations of the community which provide a more particularized content to those norms and
the actual perspectives of the participants in the terroristic process.
Whether your interest lies primarily with legal inquiry or judgmental
effort, this inquiry into community consensus and claim would seem a
most appropriate beginning. Furthermore, if your interest is primarily
one of law implementation or the protection of the victims of terroristic
usage and the prevention of terroristic strategy, then a consideration of
* A.B., J.D., University of California at Los Angeles; L.L.M., University of Virginia;
J.S.D., Candidate, Yale University.
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claims and normative content should be of some importance since
cooperative effort to implement the law seems necessarily hinged upon
a shared understanding of the content of the law and the types of
divergent claims which exist.
Before we consider the relevant norms and certain basic claims of
the participants in Mid-East terrorism, however, it would seem most
useful to consider some shared understanding of what is meant by
"terrorism" or a "terroristic strategy." It is not the purpose here to
provide a detailed explanation of the definitional approach adopted.
Rather it is merely intended to disclose a working definition to promote
continued discussion on a shared footing avoiding the ambiguity and
confusion which seems to have entered other legal discussions on this
subject. For example, some 'have viewed terrorism as "violent acts of a
criminal nature"; but that is not a very helpful beginning. Not only
does such an approach contain a circuitous ambiguity with its reference
to "criminal nature," but it is most unhelpful in distinguishing between
types of violent acts.
Instead of this sort of simplistic and ambiguous approach, terrorism
is viewed here as one of the forms of violent strategies that are themselves
a species of coercion utilized to alter the freedom of choice of others.
The terroristic process (terrorism) involves the purposive use of violence
or the threat of violence by the precipitators against an instrumental
target in order to communicate to a primary target a threat of future
violence so as to coerce the primary target into behavior or attitudes
through intense fear or anxiety in connection with a demanded power
(political) outcome." It should be noted that in a specific context the
instrumental and primary targets could be the same person or group of
persons. For example, an attack could be made on a military headquarters
in order to instill terror or intense anxiety in the military elite of that
headquarters. Additionally, the instrumental target need not be a person
since attacks on targets such as power stations can produce a terror
outcome in the civilian population of the community dependent upon the
station for electricity. There must be a terroristic outcome or the process
could hardly be labeled as terrorism (something which seems to have
eluded some of the U.N. debaters). However, there are fine lines for
juridical distinction to be made 'between fear and intense fear outcomes,
although in many cases the type of strategy could well be prohibited
under different normative provisions of the law. The point is that
definitions which refer merely to "acts of violence," "repressive acts,"
"violent acts of a criminal nature" (full of circuitous ambiguity per se),
or "a heinous act of barbarism," are strikingly incomplete. It should also
1 For a detailed consideration of the definitional framework and other types of definitional attempts see Paust, Terrorism and the International Law of War, 64 MIL. L.
REV .... (1974), reprinted in 13 REVUE DE DROrr PENAL MILrrAnE ET DE DRorr DE
(1974).
LA Guti
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be observed that terrorism can be precipitated by governments, groups, or
individuals so that any exclusion of one or more sets of precipitators
from the definitional framework is highly unrealistic.
Equally unrealistic are definitional criteria which refer to "systematic"
uses of violence, since terrorism can occur at an instant and by
one act. Indeed, the law of war and other norms already make no
sweeping distinctions between singular or systemhtic terroristic processes,
governmental or nongovernmental precipitations, or governmental and
nongovernmental targets. If distinctions in permissibility result, it is
usually the result of a conscious policy choice and not a definitional
exclusion in the fashion of an ostrich. Similarly unhelpful definitional
criteria include: "unjust" activity, 'atrocious conduct, arbitrariness,
irrationality, indiscriminate, selective and unexpected. Terror can be
caused by an unintended act and terror can occur in connection with a
demanded financial or other non-political outcome (motivation), but
such events are not the purpose of -this inquiry land do not seem to be
those considered by the community.
With this definitional framework in mind, the next matter of inquiry
concerns certain general principles of law applicable to terrorism of an
international nature. Examples of the general categories of applicable
international law include: (1) the United Nations Charter articles on
human rights, self-determination and the use of force; 2 (2) customary
norms on human rights and the use of force; (3) basic human rights
expectations; (4) the law of human rights in times of armed conflict,
including the customary law of war and the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
and (5) basic expectations concerning self-determination. Within the
scope of this paper it would be impossible to explore each set of norms
as they relate to the legal regulation of the terroristic process. Accordingly,
an effort will be made to tie in certain examples of these with the types
of claim recognized. The basic types of recurring claims made by
Mid-East participants can be classified for convenience into three broad
and necessarily interrelated types: (1) attempts to exclude entire contexts
from legal regulation, (2) claims relating to targets, and (3) claims
relating to contextual "necessity." There are certainly other types of
claims, but this categorization seems useful for our purposes.
I. A=TEMPTS TO EXCLUDE CONTEXTS
FROM LEGAL REGULATION.
A. USE AGAINST "AGGRESSORS" OR DURING A "JUST" WAR.
It has 'long been expected in connection with the international law
of war that the legal norms designed to limit combative violence and to
protect noncombatants shall apply equally between aggressor and innocent
alike. There have, however, been some intimations in the Mid-East
2 See, e.g., U.N. CHRTER, arts. 1, 2(4), 55(c), 56.
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of law in a context which they view as a war against the "aggressor"
context that certain Arab states might claim a freedom from the restraints
Israel. There have been open statements by Arab leaders calling for the
"Jihad" or "holy" war against the Zionist "aggressors," and these
statements, if not themselves of a terroristic nature, have called for3
liquidations and massacres which might well involve terroristic strategies.
It should be noted, however, that this sort of claim has not been
explicitly made at the recent United Nations sessions on terrorism
or the International Convention sessions of the Red Cross (ICRC) for
the updating of the law of armed conflict. It has arisen in the U.N.
debates on terrorism, but the only adherents are Czechoslovakia and two
of the Soviet Republics.4 Closely related claims are those of Lebanon and
the Syrian Arab Republic which refer to a situation where a people is
fighting "to reconquer usurped territories, to drive out an invader," or to
seek "the liquidation of foreign occupation." 5 With this sort of claim
coming to view we might not be able to state with accuracy the position
that some Arab states seek an exclusion from regulation of the context of
aggression. But 'at least it seems that a related claim to exclude the context
of an effort to recapture occupied territory has been made.
B. SELF-DETERMINATION STRUGGLES.
A second type of claim which seeks to exclude a whole context from
legal regulation has been posed in terms of a self-determination struggle
or national liberation movement. 6 It is difficult to judge at this time how
many states adhere to this sort of claim. Some 14 states seem to take a
similar stance, but upon close inspection many of the articulated positions
seem merely to claim that a ban on international terrorism "should not
affect" the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all
peoples or "the legitimacy of their struggle" (or words of similar effect).7
3See, e.g., E. DAVIDSON, THE NUREMBERO FALLACY 132-134, 136, 144, passim (1973),
and references cited therein; Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Violence,

66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1972).
4See United Nations Sec'y Gen. Report, Measures to Prevent International Terrorism
Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, And Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of
Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause
Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives Including Their Own in an Attempt to Effect
Radical Changes, 27 U.N. GAOR, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418]; Ad Hoc Comm. on Int'l Terrorism,
Observations of States Submitted in Accordance with G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII). U.N.
Docs. A/AC.160/1 and Adds. 1-3 May-July 1973 [hereinafter cited as U.N. Doc.
A/AC.160/1]; U.N. Sec'y Gen. Report, Analytical Study, Observations of States, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.160/2 (1973); Ad Hoc Comm. on Int'l Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Doc. A/9028]. Specific
references to the Czechoslovakia and Soviet positions appear at U.N. Doc. A/AC.
160/1. Add. 1 and 2.
5See U.N. Doc. A/AC.160/1 supra note 4 at 17, 34, 35.
6 See U.N. Doc. A/AC.160/1 and U.N. Doc. A/9028 supra note 4; II Report of the
Work of the Conference of Governmental Experts 73, ICRC (1972).

7The Non-Aligned Group in the Ad Hoc Committee (Algeria, Congo, Democratic
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Such a claim seems merely to affirm that an otherwise legitimate use of
force or overall struggle for self-determination should not itself be
considered as an impermissible terroristic process per se.8 With this the
author must agree. But, then, it would seem, to the author's diagreement,
that no claim is being made by even these states that during such a
self-determination struggle any means of force (including terroristic
strategies directed against civilians protected under the Geneva Civilian
Convention) is to be permissible in that context. There are a few states
which seem to have specifically claimed that any means utilized in such
a self-determinative process (if not in an elitist attempt to control the
ideological and political perspectives and events in a given social processa form of domin'ance) should be legal, but their uncompromising and
extreme viewpoints seem thus far to have convinced no one else. 9
Yemen, Guinea, India, Mauritania, Nigeria, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United
Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia) expressed the view that
the ban on terrorism "should not affect the inalienable right to self-determination and
independence ... and the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of
national liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter..." (emphasis added). U.N. Doc. A/9028 supra note 4. Note that a struggle
"in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter" would most certainly
seek to ensure respect for human rights in times of armed conflict (plus general
human rights). See U.N. CHARTER, preamble and arts. 1(2) and (3), 2(4), 55(c)
and 56.
8 A claim that an otherwise permissible process of political change should not itself

(as a whole) be banned because of its terror impact is far different than a claim that
any means utilized during such a process should be legitimate when analyzed as
separate strategies. It seems quite likely that most states which mention self-determination or national liberation movements wish to claim only that the overall process
should not be impermissible because of some terror impact. The author notes that the
mere accumulation of terror producing strategies that are separately impermissible
into a movement should not result in a conclusion of permissibility. Thus, the author
wishes to reserve judgment on self-determination processes with the remark that they
should not be impermissible per se because of some terror impact. Each process
would have to be examined in terms of all relevant goal values and the actual context.
Contra, U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at 7, stating: "The subject of
international terrorism has... nothing to do with the question of when the use
of force is legitimate..."
Moreover, because of the author's concept of authority and legitimate selfdetermination (by all participants in a freely determined process), see note I supra,
the author finds the remarks of Czechoslovakia which condemn acts of "individual"
terrorism "as a means to achieve revolutionary aims" quite compatible with his own
views. See U.N. Doc. A/A.C.160/l/Add. 2 supra note 4 at 3. See also U.N. Doc.
A/A.C.160/1 supra note 4 at 4 for the apt statement of Austria that "acts of individual violence should be condemned ... since they, by their very nature, infringe upon
the right of self-determination of those peoples whose Governments become the object
and aim of such terroristic acts and jeopardize peaceful and constructive relations
between States."
OSee U.N. Doc. A/A.C.160/l and U.N. Doc. A/9028 supra note 4. Included are:
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukranian Soviet
Socialist Republic, U.S.S.R., Yemen Arab Republic, Yugoslavia. Note that the U.S.S.R.
is included here while the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic is not (surely an
oddity). Specifically, for example, Yugoslavia refers to an exclusion of interference
"in any way" with struggles and an approval of the carrying on of a struggle "with
all means at their disposal."
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C. THE OPPRESSORS AND THE OPPRESSED.
Interrelated with these types of claims which seek to exclude a whole

context from legal regulation is a third and more general type which has
found some expression in the literature, but as yet, no formal adherents
in the U.N. sessions or usage in debate beyond a fleeting rhetorical
reference. This type of claim is that in a struggle by the "oppressed"
against the "oppressors," there should be no international regulation of
terroristic strategy. It is a curiously simple argument, and one that lends
itself to the simple mind. Since we seek a more rational and realistic
approach to the question, we should recall that a widely shared expectancy
10
exists that not all strategies for violent coercion are permissible and that
the "justness" of one's political cause does not simplistically "justify the
means" utilized." Indeed, the Secretary General has put it more directly
in his report on international terrorism:
1o See, e.g., U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at 7, 41. Even in time of
war it has long been a basic expectation of man that there are limits to allowable
death and suffering, and that certain normative protections are peremptory. See, e.g.,
Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, Annex, preamble and art. 2, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; L.N.T.S. vol. XCIV
(1929) No. 2138 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention IV]. See also Rosenstock,
At the United Nations: Extending the Boundaries of Int'l Law, 59 A.B.A.J. 412, 413
(1973); Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57
Mi.. L. REV. 99, 139-143 (1972), and references cited therein; U.N. Sec'y Gen.
Report, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, 25 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/8052 (1970) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Sec'y Gen. A/8052l; G.A. Res. 2675, XXV
(Dec. 1970), reprinted in 119 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 104, 108-109 (1971);
U.N. Sec'y Gen. Report, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, 24 U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/7720 (1969) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Sec'y Gen. Report
A/7720]; G.A. Res. 2444, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968), condemning indiscriminate warfare, attacks on the civilian population as such
and refusals to distinguish between "those taking part" in the hostilities and those
who are not; U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANuAL No. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
25 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Field Manual 27-10]; and Lauterpacht,
WARFARE,
The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRrr. Y.B.I.L. 360, 369 (1952)
on the peremptory norm against intentional terrorization of the civilian population, as
such, not incidental to lawful military operations.
11 Here as elsewhere the theory that "the ends justify the means" is refuted. See U.N.
Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at 41. See also O.A.S. Convention to Prevent
and Punish the Acts of Terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and
related extortion that are of international significance, Feb. 2, 1971, art. 2, T.S. No.
37, O.A.S./Ser. A/17, O.A.S./Off. Doc. AG/88 rev. 1; reprinted in U.N. Sec'y Gen.
Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at Annex V (not yet in effect) [hereinafter cited
as 1971 OAS Convention on Terrorism]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, arts. 7, 8 (ratified or
acceded to by some 11 states) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Montreal Convention];
reprinted in U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at Annex IV; Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, arts. 7, 8 (ratified
or acceded to by some 46 states including the U.S.) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hague
Convention], reprinted in U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at Annex
III; O.A.S. Res. 4, O.A.S. Doc. AG/Res. 4 (I-E/70) (June 30, 1970), reprinted at
U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at 36, and 9 INT'L LEO. MAT. 1084
(1970), stating: "The political and ideological pretexts utilized as justification for the
crimes in no way mitigate their cruelty and irrationality or the ignoble nature of
the means employed, and in no way remove their character as acts in violation of
essential human rights;" Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed
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At all times in history, mankind has recognized the unavoidable
necessity of repressing some forms of violence, which otherwise
would threaten the very existence of society as well as that of man
himself. There are some means of using force, as in every form of
human conflict, which must not be used, even when the use of force
is legally and morally justified, and regardless of the status of
the pepertrator.12
In addition another relevant trend in expectation has excluded the
offense of terrorism from "political" crimes in connection with norms
of extradition. 13 Further, relevant human rights instruments allow no
exception to human rights protections on the basis of a postulated
political purpose in cases of conduct which would amount to acts or
14
threats of terrorism.
on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, art. 2, reprinted at U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/
418, supra note 4 at Annex II [hereinafter cited as 1963 Tokyo Convention] implying
an exclusion of any exceptions to prosecution on the basis of purpose or "political"
offense (ratified or acceded to by some 62 states, including the U.S.). See generally
M. McDouoAL, F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 72, 80
ns., 134-35, 186-88, 194-95, 521-24, 529 (1961) [hereinafter cited as McDoUoAL,
FELICIANO]. II Oppenheim's INTERNATIONAL LAW 218 (7 ed. Lauterpacht 1952); Field
Manual 27-10,
3(a); J. PICTET (ed.), IV COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 15-16, 34, 37-40,

225-26 (1958) [hereinafter cited as J. PicTET, IV COMMENTARY]; United States v.
List, 8 L. REP. oF TRIALS OF WAR CRIM. 66 (1949); United States v. von Leeb, 12
L. REP. OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIM. 93-94, 123 (1949); H. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 426 (1866).
12 U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at 41.
'3 Early work on terrorism prior to 1937 included drafts which specifically excluded
terrorism or related acts from "political" offenses and created a criminal offense
where the purpose was to "propound or put into practice political or social ideas" or
commit an act with a political and terroristic purpose, thus pointing to the exclusion
of the offense from the category of "political" crimes for extradition purposes. See
U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at 11, 13, 16, 22. Furthermore, many
extradition treaties have excluded terrorism from "political" offenses. Id. at 16-21.
The 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16,
1937, 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 23 (1938), arts. 1, 9-10, 19 [hereinafter cited
as 1937 Convention on Terrorism], would arguably seem to fit within this trend. See
also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PRESS RELEASE No. 35, Text of Note Signed Today by
Secretary of State William P. Rogers Containing Agreement with Cuba on Hijacking
(Feb. 15, 1973), which seems to exclude the offense listed from the category of
"political" crimes for purposes of extradition (and this seems to be the whole purpose
of the agreement).
14 Even though the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950) allows certain derogations under
specified conditions, it affirms that no derogation is permissible from articles 2
(except "lawful" acts of war) and 3, or from other international obligations. The
convention adds that nothing shall imply any right for any state, group or person to
derogate from the rights and freedoms of persons set forth in the Convention or
to limit such rights to a greater extent than is provided in the Convention. Id. arts. 15
and 17. See also 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 4, 5, 8, 29, and
32 (not yet in effect), reprinted at 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 679-702 (1971); 1966 Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 4(1), (2), 6-7 adopted by G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. 16, at 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (vote: 106-0-0) (not yet in
effect); and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 3, 4, 13, 16, 27-33, 147 (1956), 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S.
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It cannot be overemphasized that this recognition of legal restraints
on violent coercion and the unacceptability of "just" excuses per se is a
key to the efficacy of -norms proscribing terroristic strategies, for without
a shared acceptance of these two basic premises law can have little effect
on the participants in the power process. Consequently, they will
increasingly defer to raw, violent power as the force and "just" measure
of social change. Not only is there insufficient guidance in the errant
meaning of the word "just," as with the words "oppressed" and
"oppressors," but necessarily the "oppressed" who use coercive violence
are going to become the "oppressors" of someone else or some other
thought. Accordingly, the "guidance" leaves us in a circular confusion
and leaves mankind in a ridiculous spiral pursuit of self-destructive terror
and counter-terror. 15 To add simplistically that terrorism is "necessary" so
that the "will of the people" can be expressed is similarly unattractive
and incredulous as a generality. An intentionally created terror necessarily
suppresses a free expression of all viewpoints and a free and full
participation of all persons in the political process.
Interconnected with these problems are those relating to exclusions
of legal coverage on the basis of "aggressor" status of one or more of
the parties to a particular armed conflict; and, as stated, the general
expectation is that no exception of such a nature should be made.
Underlying this expectation is a recognition that it is often difficult to
determine which party is an aggressor, that without an authoritative
determination on such a matter each party to the conflict might refuse to
apply human rights principles and the law of war to the other parties
to the conflict in the context of conflicting assertions and escalating
inhumanity. Moreover, it is observed that the law of human rights
in times of armed conflict is designed to assure protection to all
noncombatants regardless of race, colour, religion, faith, sex, birth,
wealth, political opinion or similar criteria and is a law built upon the
expectancy of an obligation owed to all of mankind rather than to
16
the mere number of participants actually involved in the fray. Furthermore, the goal values covered in that law are deemed too important to
give way to such 'a claim and most norms are of a peremptory nature
allowing no derogation on the basis of state status, political or ideological

No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention]. Note also that
these prescriptions do not depend on reciprocity between contending participants in a
particular area for their force and effect, but are obligations to mankind and state

provisional characterizations of persons and protection subject to community review.
See McDouAL,

FELICIANO supra
COMMENTARY

at 31; J. PICTET, IV
'5See

note 11 at 218-219; U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/7720

at 15-17, 21, 23, 34, 37-40, 225-29.

U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at 9, 41; Schwarzenberger,

Terrorists, Guerrilleros, and Mercenaries, 1971 TOLEDO L. REv. 71, 76 (1971). See

also McDOUGAL, FELICIANO supra note 11 at 79-80, 652, 656-58.

16 See, e.g., supra notes 10, 11, 14. See also J. PAUST & A.

TRIALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF BANGLADESH
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pretext, military necessity or state or group interest, unless specifically
stated for a particular prescription.
D. GUERRILLA WARFARE.
The last type of claim which seeks to exclude an entire context from
legal regulation involves guerrilla warfare. This claim has not yet arisen
in the general U.N. debate on terrorism. Rather, it has arisen in the
context of efforts to revitalize certain provisions of the law of war as a
claim that the means employed by insurgent-guerrillas in a guerrilla war
or armed conflict, including the terrorization of noncombatants, should be
permissible. 17 Some have even advocated that in a guerrilla warfare
context all participants should be allowed to escape the regulation of the
law. Both of these claims are minority viewpoints and both run counter
17 See, e.g., Lawrence,

The Status Under International Law of Recent Guerrilla
Movements in Latin America, 7 INT'L LAW. 405, 406, 407, 408, 413 (1973); Rubin,
The Status of Rebels Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 21 INT'L AND CoMp. L.
472, 481 (1972); T. FARER, THE LAWS OF WAR TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER NUREM-

BERG 42-43 (1971); Six Legal Dimensions of the United States Involvement in the
Vietnam War, II THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 216, 240 (Falk, ed.,

ASIL, 1969), stating that the insurgent-guerrilla has no alternative other than terror
to mobilize an effective operation; and U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/8052 supra note 10
at 56-57. The incongruency of these claims with present and inherited legal expectation
and the goals of human dignity and minimum world public order, and the inaccuracy
of related guerrilla "myths" is explored in Paust, 57 Mn.. L. REV. supra note 10 at
128-146. See also Rosenblad, Starvation as a Method of Warfare-=Conditions for
Regulation by Convention, 7 INT'L LAW. 252, 258, 267 (1973); Schartzenberger 1971
TOLEDO L. REV. supra note 15; T. MERON, SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARAB TERRORISTS'
CLAIMS TO PRIVILEGED COMBATANCY 1-10, 25-28 (1970); T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERO AND
VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 17, 22, 39-41, 136-37, 145, 192-95 (1970); Wales,
Algerian Terrorism, 22 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 26 (1969); W. FORD, RESISTANCE
MOVEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ICRC reprint, 1968); J. PICTET, IV COM-

MENTARY supra note 11 at 15-16, 31, 34, 37-40 and 225-26 (concerning the peremptory

prohibition of terrorism); P. BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS
229-31 (1908); H. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 386-87, 400-01, 426-29 (1866);
II G. VON MARTENS, Tan LAW OF NATIONS 287 (Cobbett trans., 4th ed., 1829). For

a quick reference to the broader philosophical background and critical analysis of
these philosophies from a political, sociological, and historical perspective see M.
CRANSTON (ed.), PRoPHRTnc POLITICS: CRITICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY IMPULSE (1970).
For a related claim by the Soviet Union see CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL

LAW 6 and 13 (Tunkin, ed. 1969). For recent evidence of insurgent practice along
these lines see N.Y. Times, May 28, 1973, at 3, col. 6. It isnot difficult to realize why
the Soviets are prone to accept "Neo-Machiavellian" theories that the ends (political)
justify (legally) the means when it is known that part of the Leninist ideological
tradition has been that morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the
proletarian class struggle-that its principles "are to be derived from the requirements
and objectives of this struggle." H. MARCUSE, SOVIET MARxsM-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

199, 201 (1961). At least here Marcuse seemed highly critical of this approach, stating
that "the means prejudice the end" and that the "end recedes, the means become
everything; and the sum total of means is 'the movement' itself. It absorbs and adorns
itself with the values of the goal, whose realization 'the movement' itself delays."
Id. at xiv, 225. See also M. OPPENHEIMER, THE URBAN GUERRILLA 50, 57, 59-60,
63-64, 66, 69, 161 (1969). See also A. CAMUS, THE REBEL 208 passim (1956),
emphasizing that one of Marx's phrases "forever withholds from his triumphant
disciples the greatness and the humanity which once were his: 'An end that requires
unjust means is not a just end.'"
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to customary law and Geneva law which recognize no sweeping exception
for guerrillas or guerrilla warfare. Indeed, as discussed hereinafter, the
law of war was developed with both a guerrilla warfare and an
insurgent/belligerent power struggle. Adherence to its norms and goal
values will greatly assure the fulfillment of human rights, the lessening of
indiscriminate suffering, the protection of noncombatants, the abnegation
of raw power as the means of social change, and the serving of all other8
policies intertwined with human dignity and minimum world public order'
II. CLAIMS RELATING TO TARGETS
A. COMBATANTS.

A discoverable claim relating to targets has arisen in the Mid-East
an
context and elsewhere that terroristic attacks upon combatants during
acceptable
generally
is
armed conflict is permissible. Apparently the claim
and it does seem that no complete ban on terrorism presently exists where
the terroristic outcome relates to military personnel. There are, of course,
general bans on "unnecessary suffering," the use of poison, assassination,
refusals of quarter, the "treacherous" killing or wounding of individuals,
of the
etc., regardless of the combatant or noncombatant character
9
on
terrorism
regulate
will
restrictions
of
types
These
intended target.'
acts
terroristic
some
the battlefield to a certain extent in the sense that
will be prohibited 'and others will not. Yet, no ban on the use of a strategy
of terrorism against combatants specifically appears in the proscriptions
20
as it does under customary law in connection with noncombatant targets
with noncombatants
and under the Geneva Conventions in connection
or captured military personnel (prior combatants that become noncombatants due to capture and control).21
or
Moreover, what is authoritatively interpreted as "treacherous"
served.
be
to
policies
the
and
"unnecessary" will vary with circumstances
of a terroristic
Sometimes the label "treacherous" will coincide with the use
However,
impermissibility.
of
decision
legal
a
in
result
thus
strategy land
where there is a necessary, and not otherwise treacherous, terrifying
well be
attack on counter-military groups (combatants) the conduct may
governing
proscriptions
are
lacking
Notably
cases.
permissible in most
terror- or even fear-inducing combat tactics utilized against combatants.
not
The 1949 Geneva Convention dealing with prisoners of war does
18 See Paust, 57 MI.. L. REv. supra note 10 at 128-46; Paust, Law in a Guerrilla
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Conflict: Myths, Norms and Human Rights, in III ISRAEL Y.B.
54-55; U.N. Sec'y
at
10
note
supra
A/7720
Rep.
Gen.
Sec'y
(1973). See also U.N.
art. 38), and 40
I,
(Protocol
15
TEXTS
BAsIc
I
and
56-73;
Gen. Rep. A/8052 at
1972).
Jan.
Geneva,
(Protocol II, art. 25) (ICRC,
27-10,
19 See, e.g., Hague Convention IV, supra note 10 at art. 23; Field Manual
28-34, 41; Paust, 57 Mn.. L. REv. supra note 10, passim.
33; J. PICTET,
2DSee, e.g., Geneva Convention, supra note 14 at arts. 3, 13, 16, 31,
IV COMMENTARY, supra note 11 at 31, 40, 220, 225-26, 594.
or "any other
21 See, e.g., G.P.W., art. 17 (prohibiting physical and mental torture
form of coercion," etc.).
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attach until the relevant person -has "fallen into the power of the enemy"
(Article 4) in the case of an international armed conflict, or is a
person
"taking no active part in the hostilities," in the case of an armed conflict
not of an international character (common Article 3).
B. NONCOMBA TANTS.
As previously mentioned, terroristic attacks against noncombatants,
whether they are in the control of the precipitators or not, are forbidden
under the international law of war. Customary law of war has developed
principles prohibiting attack (by any means) upon noncombatants
per se
along with significant development of specific prohibitions of terroristic
attacks upon populations and noncombatant individuals or groups. 22
Unfortunately, the intervening practice of aerial warfare has left a
gap in
the developed norms in the context of a total war and claims of imperative
necessity.2 3 However, since the era of the total war, much of the
prior
expectation has been recaptured and efforts are underway to specify
this prohibition in greater detail in the new Geneva Protocols
being
formulated. It would seem that the community cannot be too repetitive
in articulating its perspectives on this matter if it wants to guarantee
an expectation that no noncombatants can ever be the intended
object
of a terroristic attack.
Presently, during an international armed conflict, Article 4 of
the
Geneva Civilian Convention generally excludes from the coverage
of
Article 33 (which prohibits all forms of terrorism) those persons who
are
24
not "in the hands of" a capturing power. Articles 13 and 16, however,
are much wider in coverage since they apply to the entire populations
of
the parties to the conflict. For a terroristic strategy to be specifically
prohibited, it would seem to require the types of participants enumerated
(as either instrumental or primary targets): (1) those "exposed to
grave
danger," (2) wounded, (3) sick, (4) infirm, (5) expectant mothers,
(6)
shipwrecked, (7) children under the age of 15 who are orphans or
who
have been separated from their families as a result of the war, and
(8)
members of a hospital staff protected under Article 20 or medical
units.23
In the case of a conflict not of an international character, common
Article 3 of the Geneva law undoubtedly prohibits any terroristic
attacks
upon any noncombatants (captured or not) ,26 but even here a specific
22

See, e.g., supra note 10; Paust, Terrorism and the International
Law of War, supra

note
1, at nn. 17-21, passim.
2
3See,

e.g., E. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 523-26 (1931); Paust,
Decision in World War ll-Truman's Ending and Avoidance of War, The Nuclear
8 INT'L LAW.
160 (1974).
24 See Paust, 57 MIL. L. REV. supra note 10, at 148.
25See J. PAUST & A. BLAUSTEIN, WAR CRIMES, TRIALS AND HUMAN
CASE OF BANGLADESH

RIGHTS: THE

(1974); Paust, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident:
A
Response to Profossor Rubin, 50 ORE. L. REV. 138, 145-49 (1971),
in IltTHE
VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 359 (R. Falk ed. 1972).
26 See J. PICTET, IV COMMENTARY supra note I I at 31, 40.
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prohibition such as the one contained in a new ICRC Draft Protocol
27
would seem helpful. Included in a 1972 ICRC Draft were prohibitions
reprisals
of "terrorization attacks" and "acts of terrorism, as well as
2
clear its
made
Egypt
session
subsequent
a
at
In fact,
against persons."
and
persons
against
reprisals
as
well
as
"terrorism,
of
position that acts
that this
objects necessary to their survival, are prohibited," and
sruggle of
prohibition "shall apply to armed conflicts which arise from the
' 9
2
self-determination."
and
liberation
for
people under alien domination
of this
As a result of that session, however, a dangerous qualification
not of
conflicts
with
connection
in
draft
adopted
prohibition crept into the
relating to
provisions
tainted
have
to
seems
and
character
an international
1973 Draft were
international conflicts as well. Included in an early
"attacks that
terror,"
spread
that
changes such as: "acts and measures
without
launched
are
and
population
civilian
the
spread terror among
and "Violent acts of
objectives,"
military
and
civilians
against
distinction
who do not take
terrorism perpetrated without distinction against civilians
' 30
draftsmanhaphazard
this
that
doubtful
is
It
a direct part in hostilities."
attacks on
discriminate
of
permissibility
intended
an
ship contains
of terrorism
noncombatants. If properly framed, the new prohibitions
help to
might
they
because
in the Geneva Protocols will be important
on the
attacks
prohibiting
expectations
current
implement customary and
primarily
Conventions
present
the
whereas
such,
as
civilian population
force or in occupied
protect persons already in control of the military
children or "other
women,
infirm,
territory along with the wounded,
31
danger.
grave
to
"exposed
are
persons" who
Canada).

Add. 1 at 4 (reply of
27 See generally U.N. Doc. A/AC.160/1 supranote 4,
5 (Jan. 1972)
28 See, e.g., ICRC, I. BASIC TEXTs, Protocol I, art. 45, Protocol II, art.

of Governmental Experts,
(proposed draft Protocols to the Conventions, Conference of "terrorization attacks"
Geneva May-June 1972), concerning specific prohibitions
articles designed to protect the
and "acts of terrorism." These prohibitions appear in against
the dangers of armed
general population and individual non-combatants
and noninterational).
(international
conflict
of
types
3
and
2
Article
both
in
conflict
EXPERTS 34,
GOVERNMENTAL
OF
CONFERENCE
THE
OF
WORK
THE
OF
29 I REPORT
Protocol II,
of
5
and
1
arts.
Draft
re:
Egypt
of
36-37 (ICRC July 1972) (positions
for international and nonand joint Egypt-Norway position re: minimal standards
positions of Lebanon, the
international conflicts). This is apparently contrary to
of her other allies.
Syrian Arab Republic, the Yemen Arab Republic, and some
OF THE WORK OF THE
REPORT
I
see
draftsmanship
careless
this
of
30 For evidence
1972) (re: Protocol
July
(ICRC
149
74-75,
EXPERTS
GOVERNMENTAL
OF
CONFERENCE
the sole purpose
"attacks
France:
of
view
the
also
See
I).
Protocol
II, draft art. 5[bo],
civilians" supra
terrorize
to
was
purpose
sole
"whose
or
terror"
of which is to spread
at 81.
population"
civilian
the
terrorize
to
"solely
Australia:
of
note 31 at 74; the view
on
attacks
"discriminate"
allow
not
would
France
and
At least the views of Australia
combatants
both
upon
attacks
"indiscriminate"
cover
they
if
civilians, but one wonders
a terroristic purpose and
and noncombatants, and seem to ignore attacks with both
some other purpose ("sole" and "solely").
the Geneva Convention, art. 4,
31 It should be noted that most of those protected by
article 4 also refers to
however,
persons");
("protected
control
force
in
are those
protected by articles
persons
of
group
broader
a
to
and
Convention
the
of
Part II
COMMENTARY supra note 11
IV
PICTET,
J.
See
protected").
"persons
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13 and 16
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C. CLAIMS RELATING TO PROPERTY
AND MILITARY TARGETS.
Attacks upon property can be designed to induce terror outcomes in
a primary target. The question of permissibility versus impermissibility
would seem to hinge upon two types of questions: (1) whether property is
an otherwise legitimate military target, and (2) whether the primary target
of the terroristic process is a combatant or noncombatant group. Of
course, the rational and realistic choice will involve additional questions
of policy and context, but these inquiries pose important general
approaches to the matter. Moreover, if property is not a legitimate
military target or if the intended primary target is a noncombatant
group, it seems that our question has been answered-the conduct
remains prohibited under other norms.
A recent example in the Mid-East context would seem to be the
October 18th seizure of a branch of the Bank of America in Beirut,
Lebanon, by what may have been a splinter group of the Palestinian
guerrillas in Lebanon. 32 The holding of some 39 hostages, even assuming
Lebanon to be a war zone, would violate norms protecting human rights
in times of armed conflict. Therefore, it would not matter whether the
hostages were primary targets or merely instrumental targets. If only
the bank was involved as the instrumental target, however, and this took
place in a war zone, a question of permissibility is raised in connection
with a claim that the Bank of America is a proper military target and a
claim that it is proper to induce terror in noncombatants who control or
work in banking. This incident involves issues far more complex, however,
since there are counter-claims of some acceptability that Lebanon is a
neutral country and that this is a matter involving the "export" of terror
from the arena of armed conflict. Moreover, even if the attack on the
bank were permissible as such, an attack on the bank in order to induce
terror in noncombatant groups seems to run counter to the policies
behind distinctions made in the law of war concerning combatant and
noncombatant targets. A question of fact that would have to be explored
in greater detail for the acceptance of a claim of permissibility would be
whether the bank management (international and local) was directly
involved in the hostilities and whether bank employees at the local branch
or the actual hostages were so involved. Similarly, a detailed analysis of
terror outcome and longer term effects should be made as well as a
comparison of the actual tactics employed, participants involved, their
perspectives, resources at their disposal, and the arenas of interaction. This
can be related to legal policies at stake and other relevant community
expectation -for a more rational and realistic decision.
at 50-51,

118-37; Paust, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident: A Response

to

Professor Rubin, supra note 27.
32 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1973, at 1, col. 6; Id., Oct. 20, 1973, at 1, col. 2. See also
Id., Apr. 15, 1973, at 1, col. 8; id., Apr. 17, 1973, at 5, col. 3.
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In the Mid-East context there are numerous attacks upon property
which may stand fruitful investigation. For example, consider the Israeli
attacks upon Arab oil refineries, and Arab attacks upon Israeli transportation facilities, roads and communications.33 The important distinction
for our purposes seems to hinge upon the subjectivities of the participants
or upon the initial question of whether such attacks were designed merely
to knock out traditional military targets of direct use to the enemy in its
war effort; or still further, upon designs to instill a terror outcome in the
population as a whole or the ruling elite of the relevant country. Note
that a purpose to instill terror in the ruling elite, when analyzed in terms
of all other contextual variables, policies and interrelated impacts of
each, may well be considered permissible in some cases as in those
involving terroristic attacks upon combatants. One interesting claim which
is noted in passing is the recent Arab cut of oil to the United States in an
apparent effort to coerce us into an inoffensive supportive role regarding
Israel. 34 Whether the Arabs were counting on a cold winter to produce a
coercive thrust or even a terror outcome in our population or in the
politicians who desire to stay in office, is a good question of fact.
III. CLAIMS RELATING TO CONTEXTUAL NECESSITY.
A. PROPAGANDA STRATEGIES.

Actually, all of the above claims relate to questions of necessity
in the sense that a comprehensive analysis of permissibility should
consider the principles of "unnecessary suffering" and "proportionality"-with the opposite conclusion of "necessity" weighing in the consideration
of each claim. Propaganda strategies can also relate to other types of
claims, but for convenience they are considered here. Also, we should
recall that terrorism as a process involves a sort of "propaganda by deed"
or the communication of the threat of future action to the primary target
group so as to induce a state of terror. But here, it is appropriate to
consider a recent claim by Palestinian groups and their supporters that it
has become necessary for Palestinian groups to terrorize some people
in order to have equal access to the marketplace of ideas. Perhaps this is
rather difficult to 'understand at first blush; but the claim is that unless we
blast the hell out of some of you, you won't pay attention to us or our
needs. Such was expressly mentioned by a Jordanian attorney at the World
Peace Through Law Conference in Africa last August. He recognized that
"the proper way would have 'been political persuasion," but added in an
apparent attempt at justification, "would anyone listen to them?" 35 The
33

See, e.g., note 3 supra.
34 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1973, at 1, col. 6; Id., Nov. 1, 1973, at 1, col. 5. For
a legal analysis of the oil "weapon" see Paust, Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A
Threat to International Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L ....
(1974).
35 Quotation from remarks of attorney F. B. Atalla, of Jordan, Panelist of the
Criminal Law Section Panel on Terrorism, World Peace Through Law Conference at
Abidjan, Africa, 1973 (the author was a fellow panelist).
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Palestinian commandos commit terroristic acts against
and others "to earn an ear or two for their plight.
world forgets about
forgotten people, and the more ' 3the
8
desperate their actions become.
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also added that
noncombatants
They are the
them the more

The problem is that there is some truth to what each of these
claimants say-there are Palestinian needs which demand the attention of
the world community. However, developed international norms and
expectations on human rights and laws of war are clear that no exception
to certain prohibitions can be made on the basis of political or military
necessity. A clearly peremptory norm in this regard is the prohibition of
attacks upon noncombatants and the prohibition of terror directed against
captured persons. If the Palestinians want to get an ear or two through
terror attacks upon military combatants in the battle arena, however, that
is a different sort of claim.
B. REPRISALS AND COUNTER-TERROR.
Also arising out of the Mid-East context are claims to use terroristic
strategies as a necessary counter to the actions of one's adversary. The
Israelis have made headlines and have experienced an uncomforting series
of U.N. condemnations from some of their reprisal raids. But while Arab
actions have similarly arisen, there has been less condemnation in the
U.N. of their conduct. To this point, a leading commentator 'has analyzed
the question of Mid-East reprisals and U.N. condemnatory action.3 Here
we should note that although reprisals against persons protected by the
Geneva Conventions are strictly prohibited, and although the United
Nations Security Council has condemned reprisal action in general as
inconsistent with the principles and purpose of the United Nations
Charter, Doctor Bowett offers convincing argument that in some
contexts certain reprisal action should be, if it is not already, permissible.
Among the factors which he and others would consider are: the motives
of the precipitator, the targets and their substantial link to the original
wrong, the timing and necessity of the response, the proportionality of
the response, and the prior good faith efforts of the precipitator in an
attempt to seek peaceful sanctions (including the efficacy of the United
3
Nations in that regard and attempts to utilize the U.N. process). 8 Interrelated with this sort of inquiry should be the noncombatant or combatant
nature of the targets and an analysis of the types of policies involved, base
values or resources available to the participants, the actual arenas of
3

6 Letter from Hassan Abdallah, Director of the Arab Information Center, N.Y.

Times, Oct. 26, 1973, at 42, col. 4. See also Bennett, U.S. Initiatives in the United
Nations to Combat International Terrorism, 7 INT'L LAW. 752, 759 (1973).
37 See note 3 supra.
38
See Bowett, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. at 3, 7, 11-14, 16, 20, 27-28 & references cited
therein; Lillich, Forcible Self-Help Under International Law, 22 NAVAL WAR COLL.
REV. 56 (1970).
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interaction and actual strategies utilized, outcomes of terror, and the longer
term effects including impacts upon legal policy realization.
Some of the co-mingled policies to be served here include: the human
rights of the precipitators, the impact upon general norms of intervention
and the use of force in international relations, and the right of selfdetermination (for both the precipitator group and the target groups). A
more specific reference should be made here to a Widely recognized
proscription with customary background which declares that: "Every
state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state
or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed toward
39
the commission of such acts ....
A similar proscription prohibits related attempts to "organize, assist,
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or other armed
activities." 4 Further, the United Nations Secretariat 'has stated that a
punishable act should include the incitement, encouragement or toleration
of activities designed to spread terror among the population of another
state. 41 The above proscriptions are also supported by a long history of
expectation usually categorized in terms of aggression or intervention. 42
It is exactly the denial of the fulfillment of these sorts of community
expectations which has driven Israel to claim the right of reprisal against
39 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 18, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970)
(elaborating expectations connected with U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4) and adding: "when
the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force"). See
also Draft Convention for Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International
Terrorism, Preamble & art. 10(1), U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.850 (25 Sept. 1972); 1971
O.A.S. Convention on Terrorism, supra note 11 at art. 8(a); 1971 Montreal Convention, art. 10(1); 1937 Convention on Terrorism, supra note 13 at arts. 1(1), 3;
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 14, at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) (vote: 109-0-1 [U.K.]); Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 2(4), (5), (6),
(13), 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954) (adopted by the U.N.
Int'l L. Comm'n). See also LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10; I L. OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 129, at 292-93 (8th ed. 1955); 11 L. OPPENmEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 326, 332, 357-60 (7th ed. 1952). For comments on the 1970
Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations see e.g. U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418
supra note 4 at 27-29; Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713 (1971).
40 U.N.G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 41. This prescriptive elaboration is listed under
a section on U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(7).
41

See U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at 26. This would include
individual criminal sanctioning and such individual responsibility can be found in
numerous examples of current expectation or traced to customary law. See III F.
WHARTON, DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 326-29 (1886).
42
See, e.g., U.N. Sec'y Gen. Rep. A/C.6/418 supra note 4 at 30; II G. HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 155 (1941); II L. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL

LAW §§ 296, 319, 326, 332, 357-60, 363 (7th ed. 1952); Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 521, 533 (1960); notes 39-40 supra.
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terroristic elites, units or base camps in other countries. Perhaps the Israeli
conduct has precipitated counter-claims by the Palestinian guerrillas of a
similar nature. Thus, we begin to see one of the dangers inherent in this
sort of approach--spiraling violence-which must be considered by
community decision-makers in view of the escalating dangers to the
legal policies to be served.
C. EXPORTATION OF TERRORISM.

The last type of claim considered here refers to the "exporting" of
terrorism to countries or arenas which are not directly involved in the
Mid-East conflict as combatants or arms suppliers. Specifically, the Munich
tragedy, the Athens airport incidents, the coercion of the Austrian
government over Jewish transit and other incidents come to mind.43
Claims are involved which relate to efforts to stop the flow of Jewish
immigrants which will feed the state of Israel, efforts to publicize the
plight of the Palestinian people, efforts to end foreign support of the state
of Israel, and efforts to assassinate counter-military and espionage groups
(this apparently by both Palestinian related groups and Israeli or Jewish
groups)." The claims are related for focus here because of the impact
of terror across state boundaries and in countries which are generally
classifiable as neutral.
Important policies are at stake here which not only relate to the
principles of neutrality, intervention, the containment of armed violence,
and human rights, but also to the principles of self-determination. For
surely the threats to the governmental elite of Austria 'have jeopardized
the full and free determination of Austrian national policy. Depending
upon the types of targets involved, exported terrorism can also interfere
with policies designed to assure a freer flow of information across state
borders and the protection of diplomats. Thus the community benefits
derived from the diplomatic process, transportation services and interrelated human rights to travel and emigration, and policies designed to
assure a more integrated and cooperative world polity are significantly
affected. At least this is one area of concern which states, with their usual
self-protective stance, will most likely face and seek to regulate in the
coming months. In fact, many of the present efforts are designed to
impose territorial restrictions upon both the potential terrorists (who seek
43 The Munich tragedy is now notorious. For references to the two Athens airport
events, the Austrian decision after Palestinian terrorist coercion and other related
events see note 3 supra; N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 6; Id., Sept. 29, 1973,
at 1, col. 1; Id., Sept. 30, 1973, at 1 col. 8; Id., Sept. 30, 1973, at 1, col. 5; Id., Oct.
3, 1973, at 1, col. 7; Id., Oct. 4, 1973, at 3, col. 4.
44
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 26, 1973, at 6, col. 1; Id., Sept. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1;
Id., Oct. 6, 1973, at 2, col. 7; Id., Aug. 16, 1973, at 1, col. 4; Id., July 24, 1973, at
1, col. 1; Id., Apr. 13, 1973, at 1; Id., Apr. 10, 1973, at 1, col. 2; Id., June 19, 1973,
at 9, col. 7; Id., Apr. 28, 1973, at 2, col. 4; Id., Apr. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 5 (re: slain
P.L.O. leaders); Id., Mar. 3, 1973, at 1, col. 5; Id., Mar. 16, 1973, at 18, col. 4; Id.,
Feb. 1, 1973, at 2, col. 5; Id., Jan. 30, 1973, at 14, col. 5; Id., Jan. 28, 1973, at 7,
col. 1.
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to "export") and the community (which may seek to regulate matters
claimed to be "internal" -affairs). There seems to be a natural impetus for
states to protect themselves. Nevertheless, what may be lacking is a real
concern for the human rights of ordinary victims of terrorism in both
the "internal" situation and the "export" of violence situation.
CONCLUSION
It is desired here to leave the reader with one basic thought: analyze
each type of claim with reference to the types of policies at stake and a
comprehensive consideration of its context. The decision of permissibility
or impermissibility is merely a choice, and to 'be rational and realistic it
should reflect a decisional effort to locate each claim in the context of
actual participants, perspectives, base values and resources available,
situations of interaction (arenas), strategies utilized (types of terror
tactics), actual outcomes, the international community and the realization
of shared policies that are to be served. Moreover, to simplistically
exclude whole areas of context from legal regulation seems extremely
unwise and contrary to general trends and expectations which relate to the
development of a more inclusive referrent to authority, a more interdependent and cooperative world community, and the quest for human
dignity and a minimizing of armed violence. Mankind simply cannot
afford to leave whole areas of the most violent of human confrontations
outside of the regulation of law and the broad demand for human dignity.
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